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Abstract 
This paper aims at explaining how Cambodia and Vietnam responds to the rise of China by
looking at national security and regime survival dimension. While Cambodia opts to pursue
“soft bandwagoning” policy, Vietnam in contrast chooses to go with “hedging” strategy. As
for Cambodia, this strategy has enabled the country to gain much of the Chinese support to 
fight against its former aggressor – Vietnam – in case it chooses to pursue its future
invasion and to serve as a backup while confronting pressures from the international
community in regard to its record of human rights abuses and declining democracy. As for
Vietnam, the country pursues an intelligent hedging policy because China is able to provide
support that Vietnam needs to guarantee its regime survival while facing the on-going 
external pressures on its human rights violations and communist rule. However, Vietnam
views China and its expansionist policy at the South China Sea as a credible threat to its
sovereign territory. 
Introduction 
 The rapid rise of China has attracted 
tremendous debate about the short-term and 
long-term intentions of its capability. John 
Mearsheimer, Political Science professor at 
the University of Chicago, is arguably one 
of the most vocal scholars to argue that the 
rise of China is not going to be peaceful.1 
1 Mearsheimer, John J. Can China Rise Peacefully? October 25, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ 
can-china-rise-peacefully-10204 (accessed March 10, 2018). 
As he points out, China will likely turn its
economic might into military capability and 
dominate Asia, that is, what he terms
“offensive capability”. On the flip side of 
the argument, Yan Xuetong at Tsinghua
University in Beijing reiterates that the rise
of China is and will be peaceful; and would 
bring about common economic prosperity 
   
     
    
   
   
     
   
 
    
  
   
   
    






    
   
  
    
     
      
       
   
    
    
      
    
     
  
    
    
   
 
   
  
  










EXPLAINING CAMBODIA’S AND VIETNAM’S CHINA POLICIES SOVINDA PO 
for the region and the world.2 China has
been viewed by the US, as a newly assertive
superpower given its ambitious actions in 
the South China Sea.3 Its assertive  
behaviors have posed grave concerns to the
countries in the Asia-Pacific region and 
beyond. Such growing concerns among 
some ASEAN member states have been 
ameliorated through China’s tactical
confidence-building measures.4 As Michael
Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel explain, China
has chosen to pursue bilateral negotiations
with the countries with which it has
territorial disputes in order to avoid 
conflict.5 Among other recent develop-
ments, the Philippines, under Rodrigo 
Duterte, has radically shifted its foreign 
policy direction in favor of China by 
pursuing an accommodation policy. 
However, for small states6 like Cambodia
and Vietnam, their approach to China is a
critical question, requiring viable foreign 
policy options to make sure that their 
survival can be assured in the context of a
rising China and a greater power rivalry.  
Cambodia has been seen as a client state of 
China.7 This is, in part, due to the fact that it
b l o c k e d t h e 2 0 1 2 A S E A N j o i n t
communiqué that intended to criticize China
on its assertive behavior in the South China
Sea.8 In the meantime, Vietnam is one of the
claimant states over the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea, warning that it has to 
meticulously map out its foreign policy 
strategy to deal with China. The aim of this
paper is to conduct a comparative study 
which investigates the discrepancies and 
similarities between Cambodian and 
Vietnamese foreign policy towards China
(within national security and regime
survival dimensions) and elucidate why 
these two Southeast Asian countries pursue
such policies.  
2 Xuetong, Yan. "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes." Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 33-39. 
3 Johnston, Alastair Iain. "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" International Security 37, 
no. 4 (2013): 7-48. 
4  Townshend, Ashley, and Rory Medcalf. Shifting Waters: China's New Passive Assertiveness in Asian Maritime 
Security. 2016. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/shifting-waters-china-s-new-passive-assertiveness-
asian-maritime-security (accessed March 10, 2018). 
5 Michael, Swaine and Fravel, Taylor. “China’s Assertive Behavior: Part II: The Maritime Periphery”. China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 35 (2011): 1-29. 
6 For the discussion of the meaning of the term “small state”, please refer to Leng, Thearith. "Small state 
diplomacy: Cambodia's foreign policy towards Vietnam." The Pacific Review 30, no. 3 (2016): 328-347. 
7 The term “client state” , as described by John Ciorciari, refers to the conditions under which “the weaker 
partner typically repay aid and protection by supporting the stronger power’s diplomatic agenda, economic
interests, and often its projection of military might”. For further detail analysis, please refer to Ciorciari, John D. 
"A Chinese model for patron–client relations? The Sino-Cambodian partnership." International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific 15, no. 2 (May 2015): 245-278. 
8 Ciorciari, John D. "A Chinese model for patron–client relations? The Sino-Cambodian partnership."
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 15, no. 2 (May 2015): 245-278. 
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Defining Key Terms: Balancing, 
Bandwagoning, and Hedging 
Traditionally, small states do not 
enjoy much room for maneuvering. Their 
conventional foreign policy strategies 
include “balancing” and “bandwagoning”.9  
 Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." International
Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107. 
   
 
  
   
    
     
      
    
    
    
 
    
   
   
      
    
  
   
     
  
  
     
   
  
   
 
   
     
     
   
 
     
    
   
  
        
 
   
   
      
     
    
 
    
   
    
     
   
    
   
    
   
   
     
    
  
EXPLAINING CAMBODIA’S AND VIETNAM’S CHINA POLICIES SOVINDA PO 
However, hitherto, another novel approach 
– hedging – exists and gains much attention 
from International Relations scholars. 
Likewise, it is vitally important to define
these concepts in order to have a sense of 
what it is and why small states decide to 
choose one other another.   
From the realist perspective, the
term “balance” or “balancing” refers to an 
act of allying with others against the
prevailing threat and/or of building up 
internal military capabilities as a deterrent, 
in which the concept can be categorized into 
“internal balancing” and “external bal-
ancing”.10 The former means that a small
state may choose to bolster its defense
capability by raising defense expenditure
and strengthening military weaponry to 
counterweight a threat. Meanwhile, the
latter means that a small state may ally with 
another state, which shares a perceived 
common threat, in order to counter the rival
state.11 This  implies  that  the  internal  
balancing is costly for small states and 
pursuing the external balancing by joining 
other states to form security alliances or 
partnership to countercheck the imagined 
threat may be another option. As Stephen 
M. Walt contends, these small states come
to the conclusion that their survival is at risk 
if the potential hegemon becomes too 
strong. 12However, the unpredictability of 
the future balance of power compels states
not to rely on one form over another, but
rather to combine these approaches to avoid 
future catastrophe.       
Unlike balancing, “bandwagoning”
denotes that the small state “gives in” the
rival power in order to avoid being 
conquered13 or opts to align itself with the
victor to earn economic benefits.14 Robert
Ross contends that relative state power is
the determinant factor of how states engage
with one another, implying that the more
powerful states, either economically or 
militarily, in the international system will
dominate the weaker ones.15  In this sense, 
smaller states in the Southeast Asia region 
can mitigate the threat of the larger, more
powerful states by balancing against or 
bandwagoning with them.16 But there are
divergent interpretations about bandwag-
oning logic. For Walt, even though jumping 
on the most powerful hegemon’s band-
wagoning costs small states an uneven 
exchange, it has to do so to eschew attack 
and protect its national security.17 
10  Walt, Stephen M. Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
11 Ibid., 
12  Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
13 Ibid., 
14 Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." International 
Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107. 
15 Ross, Robert S. "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century." International Security 
23, no. 4 (1999): 81-118. 
16 Chen, Ian Tsung-Yen, and Alan Hao Yang. "A harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory typologies of ASEAN 
countries’ strategies to the rise of China." The Pacific Review 26, no. 3 (2013): 265-288. 
17  Walt,. The Origins of Alliances. 
Unlike
Walt, Randall L. Schweller argues that the
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EXPLAINING CAMBODIA’S AND VIETNAM’S CHINA POLICIES SOVINDA PO 
goal of bandwagoning is simply motivated 
by the potential economic gains such as
trade and investment as an exchange for its
political and security compliance to the
hegemon.18 
As for “hedging”, the term can be
referred to “a set of strategies aimed at
avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) 
a situation in which states cannot decide
upon more straightforward alternatives such 
balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality but
rather cultivating a middle position that
forestalls or avoids having to choose one
side at the obvious expense of another”.19 
For Cheng-Chwee Kuik, hedging can be
understood as “a behaviour in which an 
actor tries to mitigate risks by pursuing 
multiple policy options, which would 
produce mutually counteracting effects, 
under the situation of high-uncertainties and 
high-stakes”.20 He further illustrates that
hedging enables small states to “keep open 
more than one strategic option against the
possibility of a future security threat”.21 
Even though the concept of hedging sounds
logical for small states to pursue, some still
opt to go with bandwagoning, like the case
of Cambodia. The following section will
elucidate this difference.  
Brief Overview of Sino-Cambodian
Relations
The relationship between these two 
countries can be dated back eight centuries
ago when the Chinese diplomat Zhou 
Daguan paid an official visit to Cambodia in 
1296, initiating bilateral cultural and 
commercial contact.22 However, the rela-
tionship between Cambodia and China has
not always been romantic, as seen recently, 
but rather waxed and waned. In 1956, 
Prince Sihanouk paid his first visit to China
and was warmly welcomed by Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai. Prince Sihanouk during 
his visit was granted a “free and uncon-
ditional” gift for the amount of US$ 22.4 
million, which was the first ever Chinese
grant to a non-Communist country.23 But
between April 1975 and January 1979, 
China was the main external partner to the
cruel “Democratic Kampuchea” govern-
ment, which was responsible for the killing 
of 1.7 million people under its leadership. 
Even after the collapse of the regime, China
still continued to support Pol Pot with 
weaponry along the Thai-Cambodian border 
between 1979 and 1990.24 
18 Schweller,. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." 
19 Goh, Evelyn. "Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies." 
Policy Studies (East-West Center Washington) 16 (2005). 
20 Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China." 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008): 159-185. 
21 Ibid., 166. 
22 Daguan, Zhou. “A Record of Cambodia: The Land and Its People.” Chiang Mai. Silkworm Books, 2007. 
23 CIA. Prince Sihanouk and the New Order in Southeast Asia. May 2007. https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
readingroom/docs/esau-25.pdf  (accessed March 12, 2018). 
24 Pheakdey, Heng. "Cambodia-China Relations: A Positive Sum Game?" Journal of Current Southeast Asia 
Affairs 31, no. 2 (2012): 57-85 
Cambodia’s internal conflict ended 
with the first general election in 1993 that
resulted in forming a coalition government, 
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EXPLAINING CAMBODIA’S AND VIETNAM’S CHINA POLICIES SOVINDA PO 
consisting of the FUNCINPEC party led by 
Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the son of King 
Sihanouk and the Cambodian People’s Party 
(CPP), led by Hun Sen, a former prime
minister in the Vietnamese-installed 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea during the
1980s. Because of the Chinese suspicion 
that the prince might have close contact
with Taiwan, China withdrew all its support
from him. Afterwards, in 1997, Hun Sen 
staged a bloody coup to oust Prince
Norodom Ranariddh to tighten his grip on 
power. The international community 
responded to the coup by issuing a condem-
nation letter and cutting its aid programs to 
the kingdom. Desperate for international
support, Hun Sen turned to play the China
card by promptly expelling Taiwan’s
unofficial liaison office in Phnom Penh. The
Chinese government was very pleased and, 
accordingly, applauded this decision. Since
then, both countries have started to move
closer to each other in terms of political, 
economic, security, and cultural dimensions. 
In addition, as Cambodia tilts even closer to 
China, the country as one of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
members blocked the issuance of the 2012 
ASEAN Joint Communiqué and the words
referent to the South China Sea in the 2016 
ASEAN Joint Communiqué. The following 
section will answer the question why 
Cambodia chooses to bandwagon with 
China.        
Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Towards
China 
This paper adopts the term “soft
bandwagoning” put forward by Leng 
Thearith to delineate Cambodia’s China
policy.25 
25 Leng, Thearith. "A New Small State's Foreign Policy Approach towards a Great Power: The Case of 
Cambodia's Foreign Policy towards China." Cambodian Institute for Strategic Studies 02 (May 2016). 
There are several driving motives
behind this strategy. First, Cambodia’s
relations with Vietnam are critical in deter-
mining the country’s foreign policy towards
China. Cambodia needs China as a hedging 
tool against Vietnam. Moving closer to 
China grants Cambodia strong support that
can magnify its confidence to stand against
the aggressor and maintain its national
security. During the 1800s, Cambodia was
conquered and divided by Siam, known as
today Thailand, and Vietnam. The country 
was later united with French help. Vietnam
launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia
at the end of 1978, justifying its actions
with the excuse of liberating the country 
from the Khmer Rouge regime and its
infamous genocide. Subsequently, because
of the friendship between China and 
Cambodia under Pol Pot leadership, China
invaded Vietnam in 1979 as a response to its
invasion of Cambodia.  
Even at the present time, Vietnam
has been trying to encroach on Cambodia. 
One of the examples can be found in 2015 
when a group of Vietnamese, without any 
legitimate authority, dug five ponds at the
northeastern province of the Cambodian 
territory. If China remains an engaged 
regional actor, it would play a significant
47
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EXPLAINING CAMBODIA’S AND VIETNAM’S CHINA POLICIES SOVINDA PO 
role in preserving Cambodia’s sovereign 
territory as Cambodia needs China to hedge
against Vietnam.26 Furthermore, to mod-
ernize its defense capability, Cambodia has
strengthened military ties with Beijing. This
is evident in the recent joint military 
exercise, known as “the Golden Dragon”, 
along with the Chinese military assistance. 
The prominent Cambodian scholar Chheang 
Vannarith notes, “The continued provision 
of Chinese military support is likely to 
make Cambodia’s army feel more secure in 
its dealings with its much more powerful
neighbors Thailand and Vietnam.”27 As long 
as Vietnam is perceived to be hostile, 
Cambodia is not likely to abandon its
bandwagoning policy towards China.   
Second, while Cambodia is an 
authoritarian country, in which Hun Sen has
ruled for over 30 years,28 Hun Sen needs
China as a source of economic and 
diplomatic support in times of crisis. The
forms of the crises may include the
reduction of foreign aid from the West, the
increasing tariffs on Cambodian exports, or 
any domestic unrest derived from the
dissatisfaction of the people. When 
pressured by international bodies on 
allegations of human rights abuses, oppres-
sion, corruption, and misuse of power at
high government levels, Cambodia can 
always turn to China as the giant dragon has
no hesitation in stepping up and reciprocally 
supporting its “little brother”.29 This is
because, as Veasna Var observes, the aid 
from the West and the United States carries
with it strict conditions on human rights, 
good governance, and democracy. Con-
versely, the Chinese aid policy has “no-
strings attached”, meaning that China does
not require any documented proof for the
use of funds and does not interfere in 
Cambodia’s internal affairs.30 Another 
renowned scholar on Southeast Asian 
affairs, Carl Thayer also observes that
“Cambodia’s decision to bandwagon with 
China is aimed at insulating itself from
Western pressures to maintain a liberal, 
multiparty democracy and to respect human 
rights. Cambodia knows that if it hews to 
China’s line, there will be little or no 
interference in its domestic political
affairs.”31   
26 Leng, Thearith. "Small state diplomacy: Cambodia's foreign policy towards Vietnam." The Pacific Review 30, 
no. 3 (2016): 328-347. 
27 Chengpor, Aun. Cambodia Joins China for Military Drills as US Relations  
Cool. VOA. March 18, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-china-joint-military-drills-us-relations-
cool/4302875.html (accessed March 20, 2018). 
28 Un, Kheang. "Cambodia: Moving away from democracy? ." International Political Science Review 35, no. 5 
(2011): 546-562. 
29 Burgos, Sigfrido, and Sophal Ear. "China's Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Influence and Resources." Asian 
Survey 50, no. 3 (2010): 615-639. 
30  Var, Veasna. Holding Balance Between Two Superpowers: Cambodia’s  
Strategic Choices For Foreign And Development Policy. Eurasia Review. July 27, 2016. http:// 
www.eurasiareview.com/27072016-holding-balance-between-two-superpowers-cambodias-strategic-choices-
for-foreign-and-development-policy-analysis/(accessed March 15, 2018). 
31  Chengpor, Aun. Cambodia Joins China for Military Drills as US Relations Cool. VOA. March 18, 2018. 
https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-china-joint-military-drills-us-relations-cool/4302875.html (accessed 
March 20, 2018). 
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EXPLAINING CAMBODIA’S AND VIETNAM’S CHINA POLICIES SOVINDA PO 
The effective implementation of the
rule of law and allowing the people to vote
in free and fair elections can pose a threat to 
Hun Sen’s regime. The 2016 general
elections have proved that the level of the
people’s discontent is rising, seeing de-
clining popularity of the ruling Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP) but growing threshold 
of confidence in the opposition party, the
Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP).
Because of the trepidation of losing power, 
many analysts have observed that the ruling 
party has to dissolve its opponent and jail
the president of the CNRP by using the
judiciary power of the court. Once again, 
while the international community strongly 
condemns such moves taken by the ruling 
party, China seems to be pleased to 
announce that it supports and will continue
to support Cambodian struggles to maintain 
peace and stability and pursue its own path 
of economic development. This clear 
commitment from Beijing encourages
Cambodia to believe that its leaders could 
rest assured and continue ruling Cambodia, 
while China is and will always remain 
available in case the Cambodian gov-
ernment requires assistance.  
However, given the fact that
Cambodia seems to be so close to China, 
Cambodia is reluctant to enter into the
subordinate client state of the giant dragon. 
At the same time, the country is seeking to 
diversify and to cement its relations with 
other major powers.32 After the elevation of 
Cambodia’s relations with Beijing to the
status of a “Comprehensive Strategic Part-
nership” in December 2010 – the highest
level of cooperation Phnom Penh has ever 
reached with a foreign government – 
Cambodia also upgraded its relations with 
Tokyo to a “Strategic Partnership” in 
December 2013. As for the United States, 
Cambodia has become one of the Southeast
Asia countries that strongly back the US
policy of fighting against the so-called 
Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. 
Cambodia has committed to cooperating 
with the US in searching for soldiers gone
missing during the Second Indochinese war 
from the 1960s to the 1970s. Cambodia also 
supported the elevation of the US-ASEAN
partnership to a “Strategic Level” in 
November 2015 – a move not warmly 
received in Beijing. However, the relation-
ship with the U.S. has deteriorated since
2017 because of the government’s crack-
down on the opposition party, civil society, 
and free press. As Sophal Sek observes, this
is not because of Cambodia’s close relation 
with China, but rather the shift in America's
Asia strategy under Donald Trump.33 In 
relation to Vietnam, Cambodia is striving to 
maintain the benign friendship with 
Vietnam to resolve the mistrust between the
two countries through several state visits
and bilateral trade and investment agree-
ments.    
32 Ciorciari, John D. "A Chinese model for patron–client relations? The Sino-Cambodian partnership." 
33 Sophal, Sek. US-Cambodia Standoff. Bangkok Post. April 2, 2018. https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/
opinion/1439187/us-cambodia-standoff. (accessed April 3, 2018). 
Cambodia moves closer to China in 
order to gain its security protection from
external threats and to obtain Chinese
unconditional aid without having to address
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EXPLAINING CAMBODIA’S AND VIETNAM’S CHINA POLICIES SOVINDA PO 
criticism of its human rights abuses and 
limited quality of democracy. Despite this,
Cambodia also diversifies and upgrades its
relations with China’s current strategic
rivals, namely Japan, the United States, and 
Vietnam. Cambodia's mistrust of Vietnam is
rooted in the two countries’ history of 
conflict. Nonetheless, Cambodia's leaders
still believe that the country will progress
faster economically as long as the country 
maintains friendly relations with its
neighbors, including Vietnam. 
Brief Overview of Sino-Vietnamese
Relations
Unlike Sino-Cambodian relations, 
Sino-Vietnamese ties have more often been 
unfriendly than friendly. During the Second 
Indochina War, China was Vietnam’s closest
ally. China helped build Vietnam's economy 
while it struggled against the United States. 
Regardless, Vietnam has still viewed China
as a serious challenge to its national security 
since the end of the Second Indochina War 
between late 1950s and mid-1975. This was
subsequently followed by a 29-day Chinese
intrusion into Vietnam in February 1979, 
after Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The
broken relationship between the countries
could be seen through the escalation of that
1979 conflict and its continuing diplomatic
repercussions. Other factors include the
maltreatment of the Hoa (Han Chinese in 
Vietnam) community, the dispute over 
territorial waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, the
construction of artificial islands, clashes in 
the South China Sea, and Vietnam’s pivot to 
Russia.34   
In addition, China pursued a pro-
tracted policy of bleeding Vietnam white, 
keeping the northern border area tense, and 
offering arms and other assistance to anti-
Vietnamese resistance forces, the Khmer 
Rouge in particular.35 The purpose of this
policy was to make Vietnam’s Cambodia
venture so costly that it would be forced to 
withdraw its troops, to end its special
relationship with the government in Phnom
Penh, and to give due recognition to China’s
regional preeminence.36  During this period, 
the efforts for relationship normalization 
with Vietnam had been brought to the center 
due to the fact that border security and 
stability were vital to facilitate China’s
economic growth.37 
34 Chakraborti, Tridib. "China and Vietnam in the South China Sea Dispute: A Creeping ‘Conflict–Peace– 
Trepidation’ Syndrome ." China Report 48, no. 3 (2012): 283-301. 
35  Thayer, Carl A. "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest." Asian Survey 
34, no. 6 (1994): 513-528. 
36 Ibid., 
37 Storey, Ian. Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The search for security. 1st Edition. Oxon: Routledge, 
2011. 
The changing global milieu after the
unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union 
offered opportunities for establishing diplo-
matic ties between China and Vietnam in 
1991, marking the outset of a new era in 
Sino-Vietnamese relations after a decade of 
estrangement. Even after normalization in 
relations between the countries, a number of 
maritime and territorial issues were left
unresolved and would later come to awaken 
Hanoi’s historical distrust of Beijing.      
50
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Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Towards China 
Given the historical experience with 
and the current economic rise and military 
buildup of China, Vietnam opts to pursue
the hedging strategy against the giant
dragon living next door after the normal-
ization of the relationship.38 First and 
foremost, Vietnam’s China policy is shaped 
by the South China Sea feud, later inter-
nationalized by the great power rivalry 
between China and the United States in 
Asia.39 Because of geographic proximity to 
China and its asymmetrical power, Vietnam
has experienced numerous hurdles. It cannot
antagonize China by publicly condemning 
its assertive and aggressive actions in the
South China Sea. This trepidation can be
epitomized by the Chinese invasion of its
territory in 1979. In the meantime, it cannot
pursue explicit security ties by jumping on 
Beijing’s bandwagoning because this would 
be a sign of its subordination in a way that
its perceived sovereignty over the South 
China Sea islands may be at risk. This is
what some analysts call “the tyranny of 
geography”.40 
To break out this dilemma, Vietnam
has mapped out a “struggle and cooper-
ation” policy with China in regard to 
fundamentally conflicted and cooperative
areas, creating a “mature asymmetry” in the
bilateral relations.41 According to Carl
Thayer, “Mature asymmetry exists when the
weaker state gives deference to the more
powerful state in return for the stronger 
state’s recognition of the weaker state’s
autonomy”.42 Moreover, the Vietnamese
struggle against Chinese threats in the South 
China Sea has coincided with the great
power rivalry for influence in Asia. Such 
rivalry can be seen through the United 
States pivot or rebalance to Asia under 
Obama, Japan’s recent efforts to augment its
political role in Asia under the Abe
administration, and the Indian Act East
policy under Modi, intensifying the strategic
competition for sphere of influence. The
United States under Donald Trump has
announced a new strategic concept – the
Indo-Pacific region – that tends to invite
India to play an increasing role in the
international affairs and Vietnam, no doubt, 
could stand to benefit from this new
initiative. In the uncertain circumstances, 
Vietnamese national security interest can be
best served through its diversification of 
relations with all stakeholders in the region.  
38 Hiep, Le Hong. "Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization." Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 35, no. 3 (2013): 333-368. 
39 Do, Thuy T. "“Firm in principles, flexible in strategy and tactics”: Understanding the logic of Vietnam’s China
policy ." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 2, no. 1 (2016): 24-39.  
40  Thayer, Carlyle A. "The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China 
Sea ." Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 348-369. 
41 Ibid., 348. 
42 Ibid., 348. 
In relation to the United States, the
military-to-military ties have become
friendlier since 1997.43
43 Hayton, Bill. "Vietnam and the United States: An Emerging Security Partnership." The United States Studies 
Centre, the University of Sydney, New South Wales, 2016. 
In addition, Vietnam
has called for an informal establishment of a
naval coalition led by the United States with 
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the hope that it will contain China’s expan-
sion in the South China Sea as Vietnam has
viewed Chinese expansion as a threat to its
national security. Vietnam has forged its
military relations with Japan by allowing 
Japan Self-Defense Forces to station at Cam
Ranh Bay which could signal a Japanese
commitment to Vietnam in the South China
Sea and herald a new chapter in bilateral
defense cooperation with the purpose to 
keep the China’s surge in check. As for 
India, the two countries have lifted their 
relationship status to “Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership”. During his 2016 visit
to Vietnam, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
announced a new Defense Line of Credit for 
Vietnam of US$ 500 million, aimed at
facilitating deeper defense cooperation.44 
This combined assistance gives Vietnam
more confidence in dealing with China at
the South China Sea.  
As seen in Vietnam’s efforts to build 
stronger military relations with the United 
States, Japan, and India, three countries
which are not militarily friendly towards
China, Vietnam’s China policy is hedging 
against China rather than balancing. The
Vietnamese Prime Minister’s recent 2016 
visit to China has brought about nine
documents to be signed, including the five-
year development economic cooperation 
plan 2017-2021, an agreement on non-
refundable aid between Vietnam and China, 
a US$ 250 million loan for the Cat Linh-Ha
Dong metro line and other agreements on 
education cooperation and climate change
mitigation.45 The visit was also aimed at
managing maritime differences and main-
taining peace and stability amid simmering 
tensions in the South China Sea. 
In contrast, Vietnam has sought to 
maintain good relations with China. This is
because China has long served as Vietnam’s
ideological model that could contribute to 
the long-lasting survival of its communist
regime. While Vietnam views China as an 
external security threat, Vietnam also views
the American advocacy to promote human 
rights and democracy as a threat to its
regime.46 The act of promoting such values
encourages the Vietnamese people to better 
understand or reevaluate their rights as
citizens, potentially prompting them to 
demand more from their government in 
terms of economic and political freedoms.  
In this sense, securing friendly ties
with China is a top priority for the
Vietnamese government to make sure that
the survival of their communist regime is
sustained and avoids the same fate of other 
communist parties in Eastern Europe.47 
44 FirstPost. India signs 12 agreements with Vietnam, extends $500m for defence cooperation. September 3, 
2016. https://www.firstpost.com/world/india-signs-12-agreements-with-vietnam-extends-500m-for-defence-
cooperation-2989334.html (accessed March 17, 2018). 
45  VTV. Vietnamese Prime Minister visits China. September 13, 2016. http://english.vtv.vn/news/vietnamese-
prime-minister-visits-china-20160929172118524.htm (accessed March 18, 2018). 
46 Liu, Ruonan, and Xuefeng Sun. "Regime security first: explaining Vietnam's security policies towards the 
United States and China (1992–2012) ." The Pacific Review 28, no. 5 (2015): 755-778. 
47 Ibid., 756-760. 
Professor Carl Thayer categorizes the Sino-
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Vietnamese ideological relationship as
“close as lips and teeth”.48 He further notes
that even though the growing tension at the
South China Sea still exists, the Vietnamese
leaders have regularly conducted both 
formal and informal state visits to Beijing in 
order to exchange views on party-building 
and economic development.49 Such act
encapsulates Vietnamese top political elites’
significant recognition towards China as an 
ideological big brother. It seems that
Vietnam’s approaches China is often fraught
with contradictions. On the one hand, it
does not feel that China can be trusted when 
it comes to the issue of national security 
because of the South China Sea dispute. On 
the other hand, it has to forge good relations
with Beijing in order to secure its
communist regime since China has a lot to 
offer in terms of developing economy with 
the communist ideology.  
Conclusion
Cambodia approaches China with 
the soft bandwagoning policy. With this
strategy, Cambodia stands to gain much of 
Chinese support to fight against its former 
aggressor – Vietnam – in case it chooses to 
pursue future invasions. Meanwhile, the
authoritarian leader of Cambodia needs
China to serve as a source of support while
confronting pressures of the international
community that stem from its record of 
human rights abuses and declining demo-
cracy. For Vietnam, the country pursues an 
intelligent multi-faceted hedging policy. 
This is because China can provide the
support that Vietnam needs to guarantee the
survival of its regime in the face of ongoing 
external pressure on its human rights abuses
and communist rule. However, Vietnam
views China and its expansionist policy at
the South China Sea as a real threat to its
sovereign territory. In order to navigate the
situation created by these two security 
concerns, Vietnam has sought to make more
friends, who have viewed China as their 
strategic competitors, to gain both economic
and military support that could serve as a
hedging tool again the rising dragon.           
Cambodia’s decisions to hedge
against Vietnam by soliciting help from
China appears to be strategically promising. 
In the meantime, China has always been 
willing to accommodate Cambodia’s
request. Nevertheless, the Cambodian gov-
ernment should exercise caution whenever 
it softly aligns itself with China as the
country risks being trapped into Chinese
sphere of influence, possibly undermining 
its foreign policy’s neutrality and later 
becoming a Chinese proxy. Cambodia
should actively engage “in regional
multilateral arrangements, particularly 
ASEAN and strengthening Cambodia’s
relations with other major powers” in order 
to have room for maneuver.50 
48  Thayer, Carlyle A. "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest." Asian 
Survey 34, no. 6 (June 1994): 513-528. 
49 Ibid., 524-525. 
50 Chanborey, Cheunboran. "Southeast Asian Responses to Sino-US Rivalry: A Cambodian Perspective." 
Cambodian Institute for Strategic Studies 05 (August 2016). 
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As for Vietnam, encouraging 
multipolar balance in sync with the major 
powers such as the United States, Japan, 
India, and Australia is critically important
for the country to navigate through 
uncertain security threat. In addition, 
Vietnam should work closely with other 
Southeast Asian states to strengthen the role
of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea that could possibly prevent
China from taking any unilateral decisions
through socializing it with these institu-
tionalized norms. The options for Vietnam
to deal with China remain limited/The
country needs to push its military modern-
ization as fast as possible if it wants to deter 
future Chinese aggression. 
The theoretical lesson learned from
this comparative study is that the primary 
objective of small states’ foreign policy 
usually develops around maintaining their 
national security, which has been informed 
by the International Relations theory of 
“realism”. Furthermore, both authoritarian 
and communist elites are concerned about
how their foreign policy strategies help 
secure their regime. In the case of 
Cambodia, the current prime minister must
secure support from Beijing if he wishes to 
stay in power. If he loses the elections at
some point in the future and stages a
military coup to remain in power, he will
require Beijing’s cooperation. For Vietnam, 
the successful lessons from Beijing on how
to open up economically and diplomatically 
and foster economic growth are vitally 
important. As Vietnam intends to move
away from China, this shift may put their 
regime in jeopardy. The concerns over 
national security and regime survival of 
authoritarian and communist small states
seem to be similar elsewhere. In order to 
theorize small states’ foreign policy, the
future study should look at other regions in 
Asia such as the Central Asian countries
between Russia and China and the South 
Asian countries between India and China. 
The findings from these future researches
are likely to contribute to the theorization of 
small states’ foreign policy.      
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